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PERANAN PERLINDUNGAN PELABUR DAN TADBIR URUS KORPORAT 





  Meskipun kerajaan berusaha memperkukuh dan menguatkuasakan undang-
undang perlindungan perlabur terhadap perdagangan orang dalam, orang dalam 
masih berjaya menyembunyikan tindakan mereka dengan menggunakan kaedah-
kaedah yang lebih baru dan canggih. Walaupun kajian ini tidak menafikan 
keberkesanan perlindungan undang-undang, pencarian mekanisme lain yang 
berpotensi untuk memperkukuhkan fungsi perlindungan pelabur dalam 
mengurangkan perdagangan orang dalam masih bermanfaat. Oleh itu, kajian ini 
bertujuan untuk mengkaji keberkesanan perlindungan pelabur dan mekanisme-
mekanisme tadbir urus korporat (tadbir urus korporat di tahap firma, persaingan 
pasaran produk, dan leverage kewangan) dalam mengatasi perdagangan orang dalam. 
Selain daripada siri ujian diagnostik dan pendekatan pemulihan, kajian ini juga 
menangani isu-isu endogeneity dan perdagangan orang dalam yang berterusan 
dengan menggunakan penganggar kuasa dua terkecil dua-peringkat and kaedah 
momen umum dinamik. Set data panel terdiri daripada sekurang-kurangnya 26806 
pemerhatian firma-tahun daripada 42 negara yang merangkumi tahun 2002-2015. 
Penemuan kajian menunjukkan bahawa perlindungan pelabur dan persaingan pasaran 
produk secara amnya berkesan dalam mengurangkan perdagangan orang dalam. 
Walau bagaimanapun, fungsi persaingan pasaran produk adalah terhad apabila 
perdagangan orang dalam adalah berterusan. Sebaliknya, dapatan kajian juga 
menunjukkan bahawa fungsi-fungsi tadbir urus korporat di tahap syarikat dan 
leverage kewangan adalah tidak ketara dalam mengurangkan perdagangan orang 
xiv 
 
dalam. Secara keseluruhannya, selain menunjukkan perkaitan teori pencegahan dan 
kepentingan sekatan undang-undang, hasil kajian juga menyiratkan bahawa kerajaan 
sepatutnya menggalakkan persaingan pasaran produk untuk membendung 
perdagangan orang dalam. Selain itu, hasil kajian juga mencadangkan bahawa, bagi 
sesuatu mekanisme untuk menjadi berkesan dan paling baik dalam mengurangkan 
perdagangan orang dalam, ia sepatutnya, tidak boleh mempunyai sebarang 






















THE ROLE OF INVESTOR PROTECTION AND CORPORATE 





  Despite the efforts of governments to strengthen and enforce the investor 
protection laws, insider trading is still evident as insiders have been shown to 
counteract using new and more sophisticated trading methods to camouflage their 
actions. Although this study does not deny the effectiveness of legal protection, an 
exploration of other potential mechanisms that could reinforce the function of 
investor protection in alleviating insider trading is still worthwhile. Therefore, this 
study aims to examine the underlying effects of country-level investor protection and 
corporate governance mechanisms (firm-level corporate governance, product market 
competition, and financial leverage) on insider trading. On top of a series of 
diagnostic tests and remedial approaches, this study also addresses the potential 
endogeneity and persistent insider trading issues by using the two-stage least squares 
and the dynamic generalized method of moments estimators. The panel data set 
consists of at least of 26806 firm-year observations from 42 different countries, 
spanning from year 2002 to 2015. The results generally show that investor protection 
and product market competition per se are effective and can substitute each other in 
mitigating insider trading. However, the function of the product market competition 
is restricted when insider trading is persistent. On the other hand, the role of the firm-
level corporate governance and financial leverage are found to be insignificant in this 
study. In conclusion, on top of showing the relevance of deterrence theory and the 
importance of legal sanctions, the results also imply that government should 
encourage greater product market competition in curbing insider trading. In addition, 
xvi 
 
the results also suggest that, for a mechanism to be effective in mitigating insider 





























1.1  Introduction 
This chapter begins with the background and overview of insider trading, and how it 
is affected by country-level investor protection. Then, the next section (Section 1.3) 
discusses the motivations and problem statements of the study. This is followed by the 
outline of research questions and objectives in Sections 1.4 and 1.5 respectively. The 
theoretical and practical contributions of the study are presented in Section 1.6, 
whereas the key terms used in this study are summarized in Section 1.7. This chapter 
ends with a brief description of the organization of the entire thesis. 
 
1.2  Research Background  
The World Development Indicators1 of World Bank reported that in 94 countries 
worldwide, the global stock market capitalization has risen to $61.78 trillion U.S. 
dollars (or 98.7% of GDP) in 2015 from $51.45 trillion U.S. dollars (or 86.8% of GDP) 
in 2010. On top of that, its total value of shares traded is 1.63 times of the total market 
capitalization in 2015, which is higher than the 1.31 times in 2010. While the 
significant roles of stock markets in financial and economic developments are well 
recognized, attempt by regulatory agencies in promoting and sustaining the growth of 
stock markets has proved challenging. The prevalent view is that the stock market is 
imperfect due to weakly functioning institutions and impotent legal systems. The 
absence of strong institutional and legal frameworks could disproportionately diminish 
investor confidence and limit the supply of capital in financial markets. When a 
                                                 
1  Source: World Development Indicators, The World Bank. URL: http://wdi.worldbank.org/table/5.4. 
Accessed on 23 July 2016. 
2 
 
financial market has weak investor protections and is negatively impacted by financial 
frauds and scandals, the confidence of investors will be undermined. As a result, 
investors will refrain from trading and in turns, public investment will reduce and cost 
of capital will increase. Although most countries have legislations in deterring 
financial frauds, one of the main challenges facing by regulators worldwide is how to 
legislate more effective laws and regulations in strengthening investor protection 
particularly against insider trading.  
  The debate on the effects of insider trading is still ongoing between two 
opposing schools of thought. The proponents of insider trading argue that insider 
trading can function as a compensation mechanism in rewarding management and it 
leads to more efficient stock prices (Carlton & Fischel, 1983; Dye, 1984; Ma & Sun, 
1998; Manne, 1966). In particular, most of the advocates of insider trading have 
focused on the informativeness and efficiency of stock prices that could lead to more 
efficient markets (e.g., Meulbroek, 1992; Piotroski & Roulstone, 2004; Ronen, 2000). 
Another group of scholars also believes that insider trading can reduce the 
compensation cost and induces incentives for innovations among managers that will 
, Carlton & Fischel, 1983; Dye, 1984; Hu & Noe, 
2001).  
  On the other hand, the contenders of insider trading, on the contrary, argue that 
insider trading has negative impact on investor confidence, which in turn will deter 
public investment, increase cost of capital and tarnish the integrity of capital markets 
(Ausubel, 1990; Gilbert, Tourani-Rad & Wisniewski, 2007; Maug, 2002). Other 
arguments against insider trading are that it lowers the market efficiency 
(Brunnermeier, 2005; Fishman & Hagerty, 1992; Keenan, 2000), inflates the cost of 
information which in turn reduces the analyst coverage (Bushman, Piotroski & Smith, 
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2005; Gilbert, Tourani-Rad & Wisniewski, 2006), and causes loss of liquidity 
(Engelen & Van Liedekerke, 2007; Gilbert, Tourani-Rad & Wisniewski, 2007). 
Similarly, against insider trading, but from a different perspective, a stream of research 
raises concerns about the fairness and the morality issues of insider trading. Huss and 
Leete (1987) regard insider trading as a threat to fairness, which would eventually 
jeopardize the integrity of the market. The results of Cho and Shaub (1991) and Shaw 
(1990) also suggest that insider trading should be prohibited. This is in parallel to 
Brudney (1979) could give rise to a perception of 
unfairness, parti
confidence. In a study that concentrates on the morality aspect of insider trading, 
Hirshleifer (1971) asserts the unethical conduct associated with insider trading. The 
view is then corroborated by studies such as Strudler and Orts (1999), and Werhane 
(1989), which are also against insider trading. Opponents of insider trading generally 
agree that insider trading will diminish investor confidence and raise the cost of capital 
(Cinar, 1999).  
  T s are regulating 
insider trading. They share the common core objectives and principles that are also 
adopted by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF). These include 
the protection of investors, assurance of the fairness, efficiency and transparency of 
markets, and the diminution of systemic risk2. This has generally proved that regimes 
and firms have reached consensus that investor protection is vital and financial markets 
are in need of insider trading regulations. Investor protection has been viewed as a 
necessity in cultivating the development of financial markets (La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; Poshakwale & Thapa, 2011). Studies such as Gilbert, 
                                                 
2  Source: The International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO). 
https://www.iosco.org/. Accessed on 10 August 2015. 
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Tourani-Rad and Wisniewski (2007) and Maug (2002), among others, have also shown 
that the investor confidence and financial market integrity could be undermined by 
financial frauds and market manipulations3. Many scholars (Borg, 2007; Gilbert, 2007; 
Kadir & Muhamad, 2012) also emphasize on the importance of investor protection 
regulatory framework in safeguarding the fairness and the efficiency of capital markets.  
  The effectiveness of investor protection in the stock market has always been 
the main concern of government and regulatory agencies worldwide. The issue has 
attracted heightened interest in 2013, following the highest record of insider trading 
penalty in history. The SAC Capital, a U.S. based hedge fund, has agreed to plead 
guilty in insider trading settlement and pay a total of $1.8 billion U.S. dollars fine to 
resolve a 7-year probe of criminal insider trading charges brought against the firm by 
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission4. The settlement marks the highest fine 
imposed for insider trading in history since the 1989 insider trading prosecution against 
the Drexel Burnham Lambert Inc., a Wall Street investment-banking firm, which 
involved a total of $650 million U.S. dollar penalty5.  
  In 2016, another insider trading scandal under the spotlight was reported on the 
other side of the globe. In the U.K., a chartered accountant and a senior investment 
banker were brought to court by the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) after a nine-
year long investigation using the is the biggest 
and most complex case ever prosecuted for insider trading in the U.K. as the offenders 
used nicknames in attempts to camouflage their real identities and used sophisticated 
encryption systems and unregistered mobiles to conceal their activity. After a four-
                                                 
3  
Cumming, Johan and Li (2011).  
4 Source: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-04-10/sac-judge-approves-record-insider-
trading-accord-with-u-s. Accessed on 23 July 2016. 
5  Source: http://www.nytimes.com/1990/02/14/business/the-collapse-of-drexel-burnham-lambert-key-
events-for-drexel-burnham-lambert.html. Accessed on 23 July 2016. 
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month trial, they were found guilty of conspiring to insider dealings between 
November 2006 and March 2010, and were sentenced to 3.5 years and 4.5 years 
imprisonment, respectively 6 . In China, a state-controlled brokerage firm, the 
Everbright Securities Co. was fined $86 million U.S. dollars (or 523.29 million yuan) 
in 2013. This is -
president also faces a life ban from the securities market by the China Securities 
Regulatory Commission (CSRC)7.   
  While the stock markets are booming and are getting more important in the 
as well as other insider trading frauds have 
raised concerns about the efficacy of investor protection laws in preventing insider 
trading. Despite the ongoing and increasing efforts of legislators and regulators in 
strengthening and enforcing investor protection laws (Bhattacharya & Daouk, 2002; 
Dolgopolov, 2008), insiders have been shown to counteract using new and more 
sophisticated trading methods to avoid being detected (Barclay & Dunbar, 1996; 
Giambona & Golec, 2010; McInish, Frino & Sensenbrenner, 2011). Although this does 
not imply that investor protection regulation is totally ineffective and have no impact 
on the trading behaviour (Dye, 1984), an exploration of other potentially 
useful instruments that could reinforce the relationship between investor protection 
and insider trading is still worthwhile. This study, therefore intends to investigate the 
potential use of corporate governance mechanisms, interacting with investor 
protection, in mitigating the (illegal) trades by insiders. By taking the intricacy and 
large number of likely proxies of governance mechanisms into account, this study 
takes a comprehensive approach by considering the influences of both internal (firm-
                                                 
6  Source: U.K. Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), http://www.fca.org.uk/news/insider-dealers-
sentenced-in-operation-tabernula-trial. Accessed on 23 July 2016. 
7  Source: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-08-30/everbright-securities-hit-with-fines-
employee-bans-for-error. Accessed on 24 July 2016. 
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level corporate governance) and external (product market competition, and financial 
leverage) governance mechanisms. In addition to their common role in monitoring and 
disciplining managers, these mechanisms also share mutual linkage to the topic of 
interest, that is, via the firm-level proprietary information. 
 
1.3  Problem Statement  
In spite of the constructive roles of insider trading on managerial compensation scheme 
and market efficiency, yet, studies that examine the negative impact of insider trading 
on investor confidence unanimously claim that trades by insiders would diminish 
investor confidence, deter public investment and damage the integrity of capital 
markets (Ausubel, 1990; Maug, 2002; Qi, 1996). As Cinar (1999) pointed out, a 
the capital market is 
a place that is full of unethical activities and scams, which in turns will cause investors 
to lose faith and thence elevate the cost of capital. Therefore, insider trading is 
considered as a threat to fairness as it would tarnish the , and thus 
financial markets must preserve a fair system in order to encourage investors to trade 
and assure all market participants are rewarded accordingly (Huss & Leete, 1987).  
  Governments and regulators worldwide in general have reached consensus that 
insider trading should be banned. The grounds for banning insider trading are owing 
to the aims of promoting and preserving the investor confidence, fairness and integrity 
of the financial market (Ausubel, 1990; Cinar, 1999; Maug, 2002). The effectiveness 
of newly legislated investor protection law as well as the effects of regulatory change 
and stricter enforcement in deterring dishonest conduct and behaviour have sparked 
interest among scholars (e.g., Agrawal & Jaffe, 1995; Garfinkel, 1997; Gilbert & 
Tourani-Rad, 2008; Madura & Ngo, 2014). The findings of Ackerman, van Halteren 
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and Maug (2008), Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002), and Durnev and Nain (2007) 
demonstrate that better investor protections are generally associated with fewer insider 
trading. Both Kadir and Muhamad (2012), and Shin (1996) also agreed that stricter 
insider trading laws with intense enforcement and severe penalty can deter insider 
trading. Paternoster and Simpson (1993) and Schlegel (1990) further note that owing 
to the risk averse nature of corporate offenders, the law is more effective especially in 
deterring corporate crimes such as insider trading. Nevertheless, not all the scholars 
unanimously agree that stricter law and intense enforcement can effectively reduce 
insider trading. For instance, Seyhun (1992) observed only a trivial effect on insider 
trading following the increased in the extent and enforcement of U.S. insider trading 
laws in 1980s. Wisniewski and Bohl (2005)  study also show that insiders gain much 
more than the expected market returns, and hence conclude that this is due to the 
insufficiency of investor protection (lax law enforcement). 
 
 
Figure 1.1: The number of insider trading cases in selected countries (U.S., Malaysia, Germany, 
United Kingdom, Australia, South Korea, and Japan). 
Sources: U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission Annual Reports (number of allegations); Malaysia 
Securities Commission Annual Reports (referrals received)#; Germany Federal Financial Supervisory 
Authority Annual Reports (new investigations); National Economic Research Associates Reports 
(indictment of individuals in U.K.); Australian Securities and Investments Commission Annual Reports 
(convicted cases); South Korea Financial Services Commission Annual Reports (suspected cases); 
Japan Financial Services Agency Annual Reports (oversight cases). #Insider trading data for Malaysia 




Despite the efforts of governments in embracing, enforcing and strengthening investor 
protection laws (Bhattacharya & Daouk, 2002; Dolgopolov, 2008), the number of 
insider trading cases worldwide is not reducing. Since the world  first prosecution of 
insider trading (Rule 10b-5, Securities and Exchange Act of 1934) in the U.S. in the 
year 1961, the incidents of insider trading are still evident and remain persistent, for 
instance, in the selected countries as reported in Figure 1.1. Although regulators do 
consistently review and enhance investor protection laws, insider trading, at the same 
time, might also become less visible to regulators as obstinate insiders might conceal 
their activities through timing, spreading, deceiving or trading in a more sophisticated 
pattern (Barclay & Dunbar, 1996; Giambona & Golec, 2010; McInish, Frino & 
Sensenbrenner, 2011). However, even if regulators failed to detect the offence of 
insider trading, it would be too hasty to conclude that the regulation is (totally) 
ineffective since this does not definitely imply that such regulation has no impact on 
contemplating insiders are not deterred (Arshadi, 1998; Dorn, 
2011; Dye, 1984).  
  Although this study, too, does not deny the significant role of investor 
protection laws in alleviating insider trading, but yet agree with studies that pointed 
out the deficiencies of laws and the necessity to further strengthen the investor 
protection against the misconduct of insiders (Bhattacharya & Daouk, 2002; 
Dolgopolov, 2008; McInish, Frino & Sensenbrenner, 2011). Hence, this has motivated 
the present study to examine the potency of investor protection in deterring insider 
trading by using a more recent longitudinal data. This study is grounded on the notion 
of deterrence theory, which emphasizes the importance of legal sanctions in the 
conformity of public and crime prevention (Cornish & Clarke, 1986; Packer, 1968). 
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Moreover, instead of confining the search within the scope of law only, it may also be 
beneficial if one could explore beyond the law for other potential investor protection 
mechanism that can diminish insider trading.  
  The potentiality of the corporate governance mechanisms is examined in this 
study as they are known to play significant roles in resolving agency problems, and 
also provide better investor protection by restraining managerial misbehaviour and 
alleviating information asymmetry (Armstrong, Balakrishnan & Cohen, 2012; 
Campbell, 1979; Frankel & Li, 2004; Grossman & Hart, 1982; Hart, 1983; Jensen, 
1986; Shleifer, 1985; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). Furthermore, in line with the notion 
of monitoring hypothesis, a better corporate governance and stricter monitoring are 
shown to discourage insider trading (Amira, John, Prezas & Vasudevan, 2013; Cziraki, 
De Goeij & Rennboog, 2014; Fidrmuc, Korczak & Korczak, 2013). 
  Fortified by the aforementioned rationales, this study, hence attempts to study 
the potentials of corporate governance mechanisms (i.e. firm-level corporate 
governance, product market competition, and financial leverage) in relation to investor 
protection in mitigating insider trading. In sum, on top of strengthening the investor 
protection merely from the law s perspective, this study proposes to address the issue 
from the view of corporate governance mechanisms. In hope, this could provide a 
better insight into the issue and perhaps could be one of the feasible ways of 






Figure 1.2: The main research gaps. 
 
 
1.4  Research Questions 
The main issue materializes from the above deliberations is the necessity to identify 
other means that could possibly reinforce the function of regulatory laws in protecting 
investors from insider trading. Based on the view that corporate governance 
mechanisms are significant in constraining managerial opportunistic behaviour and 
diminishing information asymmetry, this study, hence aims to address the central 
Can investor protection and corporate governance mechanisms 
mitigate insider trading   
 In more specific, this study attempts to answer the main research question by 
examining the following sub-questions: 




2. What is the relationships between corporate governance mechanisms (firm-level 
corporate governance, product market competition, and financial leverage) and 
insider trading? 
3. How do the corporate governance mechanisms (firm-level corporate governance, 
product market competition, and financial leverage) interact with investor 
protection in mitigating insider trading? 
 
1.5  Research Objectives 
The primary research objective of this study is to investigate the role of investor 
protection and corporate governance mechanisms in mitigating insider trading. 
Specifically, the sub-objectives of this study are as follows: 
1. To examine the relationship between country-level investor protection and insider 
trading. 
2. To study the relationships between corporate governance mechanisms (firm-level 
corporate governance, product market competition, and financial leverage) and 
insider trading. 
3. To study the interaction effects of corporate governance mechanisms (firm-level 
corporate governance, product market competition, and financial leverage) and 
investor protection on insider trading. 
 
1.6  Significance and Contribution of Study   
The significance and contribution of this study to existing knowledge and practices are 
manifold. First, this study enriches existing literature that has typically examined the 
impacts of investor protection from the legal viewpoint. These studies posed question 
whether more stringent legal environment with intense enforcement can offer better 
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protection to investors (e.g., Beny, 2005; Durnev & Nain, 2007). More specifically, 
legal systems worldwide have adopted securities laws and other investor protection 
regulations in protecting investors, in which the functionality of these laws is generally 
built on the notion of deterrence theory (Cornish & Clarke, 1986; Packer, 1968). 
Legislators and regulators have great faith in laws and strongly believed that a crime 
such as the insider trading would be negatively impacted by strict regulations and 
intense enforcement (Arshadi, 1998; Paternoster & Simpson, 1993; Schlegel, 1990). 
However, their beliefs are being challenged by the facts that insider trading still 
persists despite their efforts. Besides, this study also notes the caveat on the difficulty 
in precisely identifying the events that involved insider trading (Abumustafa & Nusair, 
2011; Barclay & Dunbar, 1996). Therefore, on top of providing evidence that could 
corroborate the notion of deterrence theory by using updated worldwide panel data, 
this study is also distinguishable from literature that employed event study approach 
in examining the relationship between investor protection and insider trading (e.g., 
Ackerman, van Halteren & Maug, 2008; Madura & Ngo, 2014; Wisniewski & Bohl, 
2005). 
  Second, a strand of research that stemmed from the agency theory of Jensen 
and Meckling (1976) focuses specifically on the substitute or complementary function 
between investor protection by law and corporate governance mechanisms (e.g., 
Becher & Frye, 2011; Boubakri, Cosset & Guedhami, 2005; Mitton, 2004). The 
general aim of the corporate governance system is shown to be in parallel with the goal 
of the legal system, that is, to safeguard the wealth and maximize the benefits of 
stakeholders through monitoring and disciplining managers. Its effectiveness has been 
well supported by empirical evidence as well (Cheung & Chan, 2004; Dunlop, 1999; 
Kaplan, 1997). Although studies have reported plausible evidence on the efficacy of 
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proper legal and corporate governance systems in protecting investors, yet their 
interplay with insider trading has received little attention8. Hence, this study can be 
distinguished from existing literature as it attempts to fill the gap by addressing the 
interaction effects between investor protection and corporate governance mechanisms 
in the same model in mitigating insider trading. More importantly, the findings, 
perhaps can shed light on the underlying interaction effects between the investor 
protection and corporate governance mechanisms, which are essential in the battle 
against the insider trading. 
  Third, on top of addressing the potential endogeneity issue by using the two-
stage least squares (2SLS)9, this study also takes a distinctive approach by including 
the persistence of insider trading into the models via the dynamic generalized method 
of moments (GMM) estimations. The consideration of the dynamic model is jointly 
motivated by two reasons. First, the model is formulated after taking into account of 
the possibility that insiders might persistently exploit the long-lived and newly 
emerged private information (Holden & Subrahmanyam, 1992; Zhou, 2012), which is 
also in line with Grishchenko, Litov and Mei (2002)  that researcher 
should investigate whether asymmetric information is persistent or not as insiders 
might obstinately exploit private information through insider trading. Second, the 
dynamic GMM model relaxes the assumption of homoscedasticity of error terms and 
has advantages over the 2SLS estimator (Stock & Watson, 2012). This hence permits 
a comparison of the consistency of the estimations with and without the 
homoscedasticity assumption. 
                                                 
8  It is worth to note that there are studies examining the interaction effects of country- and firm-level 
governance mechanisms but mostly are related to firm performance and economic developments 
(Aguilera & Jackson, 2010; Bruno & Claessens, 2010; Chen, Chen & Wei, 2009; La Porta, Lopez-
de-Silanes, Shleifer & Vishny, 2000a). 
9  The two-stage least squares (2SLS) is a special case of generalized method of moments (Baum, 
Schaffer & Stillman, 2003). 
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  Fourth, although there are other proxies for insider trading in literature, such as 
the insider trading volume (Chakravarty & McConnell, 1999; Meulbroek, 1992), stock 
price informativeness (Fernandes & Ferreira, 2009; Yu, Li, Tian & Zhang, 2013), 
probability of informed trading (Brockman & Yan, 2009; Byun, Hwang & Lee, 2011), 
and share abnormal returns (Bhattacharya & Marshall, 2012; Wisniewski & Bohl, 
2005), yet these estimates are computed from either share prices or trading volumes 
only. Therefore, unlike the aforesaid studies, this study adopts a more comprehensive 
measure of insider trading, that is the private information-based trading of Llorente, 
Michaely, Saar and Wang (2002). By contrast, the private information-based trading 
measure considers realized transactions data and it also factored in both facets of share 
prices and trading volumes in its estimation. The measure has been used in studies 
such as in Durnev and Nain (2007), Fernandes and Ferreira (2009), Ferreira and Laux 
(2007), Reeb, Zhang and Zhao (2012), and Yu (2011), among others. The choice of 
investor protection measure is also done after much consideration. Following the 
studies that have shown that laws and legal protections do evolve over time (Bordo & 
Rousseau, 2006; Freeman, Pearson & Taylor, 2013; Sgard, 2006), therefore, different 
from the studies that have employed one-time protection measure such as the legal 
origin (Beck, Demirguc-Kunt & Levine, 2003b; La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer 
& Vishny, 1997) and the first time law enforcement (Bhattacharya & Daouk, 2002; 
Bris, 2005), this study uses the rule of law as it best matches the time varying 
characteristic of legal protection, as well as being widely employed as a proxy for 
investor protection (e.g. Enikolopov, Petrova & Stepanov, 2014; Gupta, Prakash & 
Rangan, 2013; Jeanjean, 2012; Miller & Puthenpurackal, 2002). 
 Fifth, the continuing efforts of governments worldwide in strengthening the 
protection of investors have faced challenges as insider trading still occurring. The 
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deterrence effect of more stringent sanctions is not as expected and insiders continue 
to use subtler ways (e.g. timing, spread, or camouflage their trades) in exploiting 
private information to avoid being detected. Although literature generally do not refute 
the fact that strong legal protection could reduce insider trading, scholars and 
practitioners unanimously concur that the protection of investor by law still have room 
of improvement. Besides, Dyck, Morse and Zingales (2010) and Piotroski (2013) have 
also pointed out that, since corporate fraud detection by typical inspectors (e.g., federal 
regulators, auditors, and investors) is rigid and costly, it is usually less effective than 
the non-conventional actors (e.g., employees, industry regulators and media). 
Therefore, motivated by the above, this study attempts to explore outside the scope of 
law for alternative mechanisms that could strengthen the investor protection. The 
findings of this study can provide insight into the potency of corporate governance 
mechanisms, interacting with investor protection, in mitigating insider trading. Instead 
of depending on the law alone, policymakers perhaps could deal with the insider 
trading by concentrating on these governance mechanisms as well. Hence, on top of 
consolidating the laws to alleviate insider trading, maybe governments should also 
strengthen the firm-level corporate governance, encourage greater product market 
 
  Lastly, the findings of this study could be valuable to the principals (e.g. 
shareholders) of firms in monitoring the agents (e.g. managers) and also for the 
investors in investment decision making. This study enriches the literature by 
proposing an additional function of corporate governance mechanisms, together with 
investor protection, that is to restrain insiders from engaging in insider trading. As the 
Hence, on top of minimizing the agency 
cost, this definitely will provide extra incentive for firms to strive for a better corporate 
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governance, especially for firms with notable reputational capital, in protecting 
investor confidence and their image from being tarnished by insider trading (Dyck, 
Morse & Zingales, 2010; Hirschey & Jones, 2001). The findings reported in this study 
are also beneficial to investors, particularly in the process of investment portfolio 
construction. Studies have reported that investors are inclined to invest in countries 
with strong investor protection and tend to avoid problematic firms (Boubakri, Cosset 
& Guedhami, 2005; Leuz, Lins & Warnock, 2008; Poshakwale & Thapa, 2011). Since 
the opportunistic behavior of managers is usually unnoticeable by outsiders, hence, in 
addition to the quality of firm-level corporate governance and country-level investor 
protection, investors can also take into account the extent of product market 
competition and financial leverage ratio in investment decision making.   
 
1.7  Glossary of Terms 
The definition of the key variables and major terms used in this study are presented in 
this section. This includes the definitions of the independent variable (insider trading), 
and the main explanatory variables (country-level investor protection, firm-level 
corporate governance, product market competition, and financial leverage ratio), and 
also the definitions of other major terms such as the private information, insider, and 
deterrence. 
 
 Insider trading  is the purchase or sale of securities, with scienter (or guilty 
knowledge), while in possession of material, non-public information in breach of 




The insider trading is measured by the private 
information-based trading proposed by Llorente, Michaely, Saar and Wang (2002).  
 
 is defined as the 
, where a few commonly used 
mechanisms of investor protection, are the rule of law, board structure, and the 
efficiency of legal system (Jeanjean, 2012, p.358). The country-level investor 
protection measure is adopted from the rule of law of The Heritage Foundation. 
 
 is 
Becht, Bolton & Röell, 2003, p.3) or in 
other words
(Cheung & Chan, 2004, p.1). The firm-level corporate governance 
score is adopted from the ASSET4 ESG Data of Datastream, Thomson Reuters. 
 
 
Karuna, 2007, p.277). The product market 
competition is measured by one minus the industry Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, 
that is, one minus the sum of squared market shares of N listed firms in the industry 
at three-digit ICB code level. (Giroud & Mueller, 2011; John, Litov & Yeung, 2008; 
Piotroski & Roulstone, 2004; Tookes, 2008). The alternative measure of product 
market competition used in the sensitivity analysis is measured by one minus the 
4-firm concentration ratio of a country accounted for by the four largest listed firms 
(by sales) in the industry (at three-digit Industry Classification Benchmark code) 
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in a country (Birt, Bilson, Smith & Whaley, 2006; Chen, Wang & Li, 2012; Chu 
& Song, 2010; Karuna, 2007).  
 
  
(Hillier, Ross, Westerfield, Jaffe & Jordan, 2010, p.326). The financial leverage is 
measured by the ratio of total debt to the total asset. The alternative measure of 
financial leverage used in the sensitivity analysis is measured by the ratio of total 
debt to the total capital (Abor, 2005; Cline, Garner & Yore, 2014; Li, Nguyen, 
Pham & Wei, 2011). 
 
 influential information that is private or yet to be 
disseminated through proper means which would probably affect the share price 
of a security and also the investment decisions of reasonable investors (Aier, 2013; 
Aktas, De Bodt & Van Oppens, 2008; Albuquerque, De Francisco & Marques, 
2008; Allen, 2001; Barclay & Dunbar, 1996; Damodaran & Liu, 1993; Narayanan, 




are likely to have privileged access to the proprietary information (Becher 
& Frye, 2011; Jin & Myers, 2006; Kapopoulos & Lazaretou, 2007; Morck, Shleifer 
& Vishny, 1988). In 
shareholders, tippees, legislators, government employees, professional service 
providers, and individuals who misappropriate the confidential information (Du & 
Wei, 2004; Khanna, 1997; Lemmon & Lins, 2003; Linciano, 2003; Moore, 1990; 
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Nagy, 2011; Newkirk & Robertson, 1998; Schieberl & Nickles, 2013; Thomsen, 






1.8  Organization of the Thesis 
This thesis is systematically organized into five chapters, each with their own purpose. 
This chapter (Chapter 1) first discusses the background and the problems that initiated 
this study, followed by the research questions and objectives developed from the 
current issues. The importance and the expected contributions of the study are also 
outlined in this chapter.  
  The second chapter discusses the outcome of the review of literature 
concerning insider trading and its impacts, country-level investor protection and 
deterrence theory, firm-level corporate governance, product market competition, and 
financial leverage. In addition, this chapter also elaborates the rationales behind the 
formulation of the hypotheses of the relationships between the investor protection and 
corporate governance mechanisms in relation to insider trading.  
  In Chapter three, the methodology of the research involved in this study is 
presented in details. This includes the research framework that is supported by a 
summary of the theoretical foundations, the list of hypotheses, the specifications of the 
2SLS and dynamic GMM models, the details of the diagnostic tests and remedial 
methods, the definitions and estimations of the main and control variables, the 
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alternative measures used in the sensitivity analysis, and lastly, the sources and the 
description of the data.  
  Chapter four presents the descriptive statistics, the results of the 2SLS and 
GMM main and sub-models, as well as the outputs of the diagnostic and robustness 
tests in details. Lastly, the conclusions and implications of the study are put forth in 
Chapter five, and it ends with a discussion on the limitations of the study and also a 






















LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS FORMULATION 
 
2.1  Introduction 
This chapter presents a systematic review of literature on insider trading, country-level 
investor protection, corporate governance mechanisms, as well as the rationales of 
their relationships. Section 2.2 provides the overview of insider trading and discusses 
the impacts of insider trading from the consequentialist and non-consequentialist 
perspectives. The literature related to country-level investor protection such as the 
legal origin, insider trading law, and the legal enforcement is presented in Section 2.3. 
The relationship between investor protection and insider trading, on the basis of 
deterrence theory, is also discussed in this section. This is followed by a review on the 
firm-level corporate governance and a discussion on the reasoning of its relationship 
with insider trading in Section 2.4. The summary of the literature review on product 
market competition and financial leverage is presented in Section 2.5 and 2.6, 
respectively, with each section ends with the justification of their relationship with 
insider trading. The relationships between the investor protection, corporate 
governance mechanisms, and insider trading are discussed in Section 2.7. The 
development of hypotheses of this study is presented in Section 2.8. Finally, Section 
2.9 concludes the chapter. The summary of the literature concerning the relations of 
investor protection, firm-level corporate governance, product market competition, and 






2.2  Insider Trading 
This section first provides an overview of insider trading in sub-section 2.2.1, which 
includes the definitions of private information, insiders and insider trading. This 
section also provides the evidence of insider trading as well as noting the reason why 
insider still engage in insider trading in spite of probable legal action. The impacts of 
insider trading are also discussed in the sub-section 2.2.2. 
 
2.2.1  An Overview of Insider Trading   
Following the review on the subjects related to insider trading, this section first 
presents the definitions of private information and insider. This is followed by a 
discussion on the meaning of legal and illegal insider trading. The last sub-section 
presents the evidence of insider trading, and also discusses the incentives of insider 
trading, that is, what actually tempted insider to realize their information advantage 
through (illegal) insider trading despite the probable legal actions? 
 
2.2.1(a) Definition of Private Information 
The financial markets typically comprised of various types of traders who, with 
different incentives and motivations, trade using all sorts of trading strategies. Among 
them are those who are perceived to have advantages over other traders by having the 
possession of material non-public information (Fishman & Hagerty, 1992). In this 
non-public 
unambiguously. Following the explication of the Supreme Court of U.S. in the case of 
TSC Industries v. Northway, Inc.10, which is expressly adopted by the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) of U.S. for the Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 as there is 
                                                 
10 Case 426 U.S. 438 (1976). Accessible in https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/426/438. 
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no statutory definition available, 
likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the 
reasonable investor as having significantly altered the "total mix" of information made 
11 Put differently, information is considered as 
disclosed, it would probably distort the existing aggregate information of a firm in the 
market, which in turn would be factored in by reasonable investors in their investment 
decision making process and thence cause impact on the share prices (Joint Market 
Practices Forum, 2003). The Information is non-
public if it has not been disseminated in a manner making it available to investors 
12 non-public ate information that is 
yet to (or might never) be disclosed to the public through proper channels. Thus, if 
non-public 
non-public fluential information 
that is private or yet to be disseminated through proper means which would probably 
affect the share prices of a security and also the investment decisions of reasonable 
investors.  
  However, in finance literature, the terms such as , 
Aier, 2013; Aktas, De Bodt & Van Oppens, 2008; Albuquerque, De Francisco & 
Marques, 2008; Allen, 2001; Barclay & Dunbar, 1996; Damodaran & Liu, 1993; 
Narayanan, 1985; Ronen, 2000) and , Abumustafa & Nusair, 
2011; Banerjee & Eckard, 2001; Barnes, 1996; Bernhardt, Hollifield & Hughson, 1995; 
Bettis, Coles & Lemmon, 2000; Bhattacharya & Marshall, 2012; Boardman, Liu, 
                                                 
11  Kindly refer to Lin, T.C.W., 2015. Reasonable investors. Boston University Law Review, 95, 
pp.461-  
12  Kindly refer to Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Securities and Exchange Commission, 17 




Sarnat & Vertinsky, 1998) non-public 




2.2.1(b) Definition of Insider 
Who might actually possess the private information? Intuitively, there is only a limited 
daily management and operations are likely to have privileged access to the 
information (Jin & Myers, 2006). In line with the U.S. and many other jurisdictions, 
this group of individuals is 
Becher & Frye, 2011; Kapopoulos & 
Lazaretou, 2007; Morck, Shleifer & Vishny, 1988). Nevertheless, in a broader 
Jaffe, 1974; Kini & Mian, 1995; Liang, Lin & Syu, 2010), 
tippees such as family members and friends who received private information from 
corporate insiders (Khanna, 1997; Lemmon & Lins, 2003; Linciano, 2003; Moore, 
1990), those who render legal, financial or other professional services to company or 
corporate insiders such as lawyers, accountants, auditors, brokers, investment bankers 
and financial advisors (Du & Wei, 2004; Etebari, Tourani-Rad & Gilbert, 2004; 
Hensley, 1969; Wisniewski, 2004), legislators or government employees (Nagy, 2011; 
Schieberl & Nickles, 2013), and also individuals who misappropriate confidential 
information from their employer or family members (Newkirk & Robertson, 1998; 
Thomsen, 2008).   
 
